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In this paper, I explore a range of existent and possible 
ameliorative semantic theories of gender terms: 
invariantism, according to which gender terms are not 
context-sensitive, contextualism, according to which the 
meaning of gender terms is established in the context of 
use, and relativism, according to which the meaning of 
gender terms is established in the context of assessment. I 
show that none of these views is adequate with respect to 
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the plight of trans people to use their term of choice to 
self-identify and be referred to accordingly. I then consider 
an invariantist view based on self-identification and 
explore some of its challenges. 
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I. Introduction 
Gender terms play a crucial function in our lives. We use them 
to self-identify and to categorize beings around us. We include and 
exclude people from various groups based on gender terms, draw 
policies, and elect presidents. But what exactly is the meaning of 
such terms? What do “man,” “woman,” “gender-neutral,” for 
example, mean? Equally important, what should they mean? 
In the philosophy of language, discussion of the meaning of 
gender terms has been mostly conducted within what is known as 
“ameliorative projects.” Famously, Sally Haslanger (2000, 2006) has 
distinguished between conceptual, descriptive, and ameliorative 
projects. In contrast to the first two, in pursuing an ameliorative 
project in the philosophy of language we strive to come up with 
accounts of the meaning of “loaded” terms (gender terms included) 
that are sensitive to social, moral and political ideals. Put differently, 
by pursuing an ameliorative project we end up not with what the 
target terms mean or what concepts are operational in a community 
(as the conceptual and descriptive projects have it), but with what 
they should mean in light of the types of ideals mentioned. While 
such ideals can be incorporated in descriptive projects as well (see, 
for example, Díaz-León, 2016), it is within an ameliorative mindset 
that I will proceed in this paper. 
While gender terms are widely used, here I will focus on how 
they are used (or, rather, should be used) mostly by, and in 
connection to, trans people (in fact, a subgroup thereof—see below). 
There are at least two reasons for this. First, in most societies trans 
people face serious discrimination. At a minimum, an ameliorative 
project involving gender terms should aim at finding an account of 
such expressions that allows trans people to be treated justly. 
Second, the way in which gender terms are used by, and in 
connection to, trans people has been taken to provide a crucial test 
case for various theories of the meaning of gender terms (both 
descriptive and ameliorative). Thus, the great majority of the recent 
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papers tackling gender terms—including the ones I will discuss 
below—address the issues raised by such use. I will follow suit. 
I think the considerations offered apply to all gender terms, a 
comprehensive analysis of which is obviously a major desideratum 
for an ameliorative approach. However, to make the paper 
manageable, I restrict the discussion to the term “man.” More 
specifically, throughout the paper I focus on such sentences as  
(G) John is a man, 
where John is a trans man who has not undergone gender-affirming 
medical procedures. The reason for this restriction will become clear 
in due course. 
Before starting, let me specify more accurately what I take the 
ameliorative enterprise I am engaged in to be. Above, I said that the 
main goal of an ameliorative account of gender terms should allow 
trans people to be treated justly (or at least to increase the chances 
of that happening). Quite plausibly, just treatment entails, in part, 
allowing trans people to self-identify by using the gender terms of 
their choice.1 But it is also plausible that a part of just treatment is 
to demand that the choices trans people make in this connection be 
respected by others. Translated in semantic terms, the ameliorative 
project should thus provide an account in which sentences like (G) 
come out as true in the right contexts—those in which trans people 
themselves utter sentences like (G) (in fact, corresponding sentences 
containing first person pronouns, such as “I am a man”), but also in 
contexts in which non-trans people utter them. What exactly the 
right contexts are is a contentious matter; in what follows I will make 
clear what the authors I discuss take them to be, as well as give my 
own opinion. Providing an answer to this question is important both 
for setting the desiderata of an ameliorative semantic theory and for 
evaluating its success. 
                                                 
1 See Barnes (2020), Bettcher (2009), Jenkins (2016)—among many others. 
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One might, of course, object to this way of pursuing the 
ameliorative project in relation to gender terms. For example, one 
might think that focusing on the semantics of sentences like (G) 
(whose job is, among other things, to provide truth-conditions that 
account for the intuitive truth-values of such sentences on various 
contexts) is not necessary, since we have other mechanisms (e.g., 
pragmatic mechanisms like presupposition or implicature, ambiguity 
resolution, assertability conditions etc. 2 ) that might better serve 
amelioration. Another observation, mostly coming from those 
interested in the metaphysics of gender, is that tracking “real 
gender” might not help, or even be detrimental, to amelioration, and 
that, once we give up that chase, a pluralist or even an eliminativist 
view of gender that better serves amelioration opens up. 3  I 
acknowledge that these other ways of achieving ameliorative goals 
are legitimate, and that an exploration of the non-semantic 
mechanisms involved is a worthwhile endeavor. But I also think that 
the purely semantic route is worth pursuing and that, at the end of 
the day, it might yield some satisfactory results. Regarding the focus 
on “real gender”, as far as I can tell the views discussed below can 
be severed from their ontological underpinnings—mostly because 
they are taken to be ameliorative accounts and thus disconnected 
from “what there is” (which is not to say that they ignore relevant 
aspects of reality, especially those about injustice), 4  but I also 
acknowledge that it is quite possible that a pluralist or even an 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., Barnes (2020), Bettcher (2009), Laskowski (2020). 
3 See, e.g., Barnes (2020), Dembroff (2018). 
4 Thus, I am not convinced that the views discussed in what follows (at least not all of 
them) must be understood as subscribing to what Dembroff (2018) calls “the Real Gender 
assumption” that, according to them, leads to ontological oppression. In fact, I believe 
that semanticists are (somewhat) free to adopt all kinds of metaphysical views, and in the 
case of gender the offer is very rich—including a deflationary account such as that 
recently proposed by Anthony (2020). There are also voices that deny that ameliorative 
projects related to trans people are sufficient to improve their lives (e.g., Kapusta, 2016). 
I agree, of course, that merely devising such projects is not enough, but I assume that 
they do play a role in improving trans people’s lives. 
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eliminativist stance is better for ameliorative purposes. Thus, in this 
paper I refrain from getting into debates about what is the best way 
of conceiving an ameliorative project regarding gender terms and 
focus solely on the “(monistic) semantic way to amelioration”; I do 
so in the hope that it will make for an interesting and ultimately 
useful project—one that does not take on unwanted metaphysical 
commitments. 
Bearing that in mind, the goal of the paper is to investigate 
several well-known positions in the semantics of various natural 
language terms in order to ascertain which could provide the best 
ameliorative account of gender terms (particularly “man”). I will 
thus explore invariantist (Section II), contextualist (Section III) and 
relativist (Section IV) views, present their main versions and the 
most important objections that have been raised against them. While 
some of these views have been discussed at length in the literature 
(invariantism, contextualism), others have not yet been proposed 
(relativism). So, part of my aim here is to offer a map of possible 
positions vis-à-vis the issue in question.5 Importantly, some of the 
authors to be discussed have put forward specific semantic views 
about gender terms but taken amelioration to consist of something 
other than coming up with a semantic account with the features 
sketched above. That is fine with me, and confusion should be kept 
at bay if it is understood that my interest is purely in the semantic 
aspect of those proposals, and not on those authors’ different views 
on amelioration. In addition to this descriptive/critical aim, after 
concluding that the views scrutinized are problematic with respect 
to the issue at hand, I venture a positive view. Thus, in Section V, I 
sketch an invariantist view based on self-identification and discuss 
various issues, including the need for an account of self-
identification. While I acknowledge from the outset that the view I 
propose needs to be further developed, I am confident that it leads 
                                                 
5 Thus, there will be some overlap with previous overviews of such views—e.g., Bettcher 
(2017); Mikkola (2016); Saul & Díaz-León (2018). I have tried to keep the discussion of 
such views short and focus on discussing views previously not included. 
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to an interesting position in the (ameliorative) semantics of gender 
terms. 
II. Invariantist Views 
Invariantism about a certain type of expression is the general 
view that the truth-values of sentences containing the target 
expression—but no other obviously (or arguably) context-sensitive 
terms—do not vary across contexts. Take the word “gold,” for 
example. Whether something is gold or not is true in any context, 
depending solely on whether the thing in question has certain 
essential properties—say, atomic number 79. Thus, a sentence like 
“The Statue of Liberty’s torch is covered in gold” has an absolute 
truth-value, and no relativization to contexts or any other 
parameters is postulated.6 
When it comes to gender terms, two views on gender have been 
popular: according to the first, gender is, or is reducible to, 
biological traits; according to the second, gender is, or is reducible 
to, societal roles. On the former view, for a subject to be a man is 
for that subject to possess certain biological markers (usually, penis, 
testicles, XY chromosomes etc.; similarly for other gender terms); 
on the latter, for a subject to be a man is for that subject to fulfill a 
certain role or roles in a society (traditionally, breadwinner, 
protector, etc.; similarly for other gender terms). As expected, these 
views infuse the semantics of gender terms. The best way to 
characterize the semantic views such broad approaches to gender 
lead to is as invariantist views. Thus, the truth-conditions of (G) 
according to the former view (call it “biological invariantism”) and 
according to the latter (call it “social invariantism”) are given by the 
first and the second clauses below, respectively: 
                                                 
6 In possible world semantics, the framework I operate here with, all sentences have their 
truth-values relative to possible worlds. I ignore this parameter for simplicity’s sake. 
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(G) is true iff John possesses biological traits like penis, 
testicles, XY chromosomes etc. 
(G) is true iff John plays the societal role of breadwinner, 
protector etc.    
As with sentences like “The Statue of Liberty’s torch is covered in 
gold,” no relativization to contexts or other parameters is needed; 
John is man, regardless of the context in which (G) is uttered, if he 
fulfills the conditions given in the clauses above. 
As has been extensively argued (Bettcher, 2017; Díaz-León, 
2016; Jenkins, 2016; Mikkola, 2016; Saul, 2012), both these broad 
views on gender are problematic. One of the main problems faced 
by the biological view is its commitment to a binary notion of sex. 
There is ample evidence that the biological traits connected to sex 
do not divide naturally into two mutually exclusive groups. The 
existence of intersex people is a case in point. Furthermore, Ayala 
& Vasilyeva (2015) have recently argued that the binary distribution 
of biological traits is endangered by the possibility of conceiving sex 
as “extended.” The biological view thus seems to rely on an easily 
discreditable binary view of sex, without which biological 
invariantism is untenable. 
On the other hand, the main problem for the social view has to 
do with finding the unique societal role for men required by the 
definition. As remarked repeatedly, both men and women occupy a 
multitude of very different societal roles. Perhaps finding a unique 
such role is not something to which the social view on gender is 
committed, but without delineating at least a relatively well-
circumscribed set of such roles, the view is in danger of losing its 
substantive character. However, even that proves to be notoriously 
difficult.7 
                                                 
7 An important view to mention here is Haslanger’s (2000). According to her, someone 
counts as a man/woman in virtue of occupying a superior/subordinate role in society. 
This definition has been criticized by, e.g., Jenkins (2016); Mikkola (2011); Saul (2012). 
For a recent defense of the main points of Haslanger’s view, see Barnes (2020). Barnes’ 
view, however, is not invariantist. 
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More important for my purpose here, neither of the two views 
yields the right result in connection to the truth-value of sentences 
like (G). According to biological invariantism, (G) comes out as false 
in any context, given that what it takes for John to be a man is the 
possession of the relevant biological traits. Since John has not 
undergone gender-affirming medical procedures, he does not 
possess the biological traits required by the view, and thus does not 
count as a man.8 This is so even if (G) (or, rather, “I am a man”) is 
uttered by John himself. This is a very unsatisfactory result, one that 
is obviously incompatible with the ameliorative project on the table. 
On the other hand, according to social invariantism, (G) is true if 
and only if John fulfills the societal role required by the view 
(breadwinner, protector etc.). While John fulfilling that role is this 
is certainly possible, it is equally possible that John does not; if so, 
(G) comes out as false. Again, this is so even if (G) (or, rather, “I am 
a man”) is uttered by John himself. Tying gender to a certain social 
role seems quite unintuitive and surely not satisfactory from an 
ameliorative standpoint, since trans people (John included) want to 
use gender terms of their choice, regardless of the societal role they 
happen to play. Both biological and social invariantism are thus 
unsuitable for the type of ameliorative project pursued here. 
III. Contextualist Views 
Contextualism about a type of expression is the general view 
that the truth-values of sentences containing the target expression, 
but no other obviously (or arguably) context-sensitive terms, vary 
across contexts, because the contents of those sentences are different 
in different contexts. Many types of expressions in natural language 
                                                 
8 Here one can see why the restriction to a sub-group of trans people (that is, to those who 
did not undergo gender-affirming medical procedures) is important. The biological view 
could, in principle, yield the right result in relation to the truth-value of sentences like (G) 
if John is a trans man who did have medical procedures that would confer him the 
required biological traits. 
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have been taken to be context-sensitive in this sense, and the 
perceived variation in truth-value to support contextualism about 
those expressions.9 A similar variation is perceived with sentences 
like (G). For example, in a context in which the issue is whether 
John should be able to use the men’s bathroom (for brevity, 
BATHROOM), (G) is intuitively true, while in a context in which 
the issue is whether John should have medical procedures related to 
female biology or participate in men’s sports competitions (for 
brevity, MEDICAL/SPORTS), (G) is intuitively false.10 Here, we 
have an example of what the right contexts in which sentences like 
(G) should come out as true are taken by a theory to be: namely, 
contexts like BATHROOM, but not contexts like MEDICAL/ 
SPORTS. Taking such variation into account, several types of 
contextualist views about gender terms have been proposed in the 
literature. 
A. Attributor Contextualism 
Attributor-contextualism about gender terms is the general 
view that the truth-value of gender-attributing sentences is 
determined by various factors in the context of utterance (CU)—that 
is, the context of the speaker, or of the attributor. There are many 
contextual factors that have been taken to determine truth-value of 
sentences in context and many ways in which they do so. For 
purposes of generalization, I will dub the factor that determines the 
truth-value of (G) in a context “the count-as parameter.” According 
                                                 
9 The term mostly used for comparison in the literature is “know,” in case of which the truth-
value of sentences like “Moore knows that he has hands” is taken to vary between, say, 
ordinary and skeptical contexts. The debate has opposed invariantism and contextualism— 
much like in the case of gender terms. A classical reference for contextualism about 
“know” is DeRose (1992). For a classical invariantist defense, see Rysiew (2001). 
10 I do not subscribe to the latter intuition. I am assuming it is correct only to present 
a prima facie case for contextualism. I am also not assuming that all contextualists 
subscribe to these intuitions—although many of them explicitly subscribe to the 
intuition that, in contexts like MEDICAL, (G) should come out as false.   
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to attributor-contextualism, then, the truth-conditions for (G) are 
given by something along the following lines: 
(G) is true in context CU iff John counts as a man in CU. 
A difference between contextualism and invariantism that can be 
immediately seen is that in the clause above, the truth of (G) is 
relative to a context of utterance, while in the invariantist clause no 
such relativization is present. 
As expected, the view is well-suited to account for the variation 
in (G)’s truth-value across contexts. Thus, in BATHROOM, the 
count-as parameter is simply self-identifying as a man. Since John 
does self-identify as such, (G) comes out as true in this context. 
However, in MEDICAL/SPORTS, the count-as parameter is the 
possession of male biological traits. Since John does not possess such 
traits, (G) comes out as false in this context. 
Although it seems clear that attributor-contextualism fares 
better than invariantism on this score, it is not problem-free. The 
problem most relevant for my purposes here is the one that Jennifer 
Saul (2012) points out in connection to variant of contextualism she 
herself discusses.11 Saul notes that (attributor-)contextualism fails 
short of being sensitive to the ameliorative goals we are after. To see 
this, one has only to consider that sentences like (G) (or, rather, their 
negations) are uttered not only by trans people and their allies, but 
by transphobes as well. Since according to the view the count-as 
parameter is determined in the context of utterance (that is, by the 
speaker/attributor), and since the speaker is a transphobe, it is the 
transphobe that determines the count-as parameter. Presumably, for 
                                                 
11 According to Saul’s view, the truth-conditions for (G) are as follows: 
(G) is true in a context CU iff John is human and relevantly similar (according to 
the standards at work in CU) to most of those possessing all of the biological 
markers of male sex. 
The definition incorporates biological traits, but allows for context-sensitivity by 
pinning it down to the standards of similarity that can differ across contexts of 
utterance. Thus, they are what I called “the count-as parameter.” 
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the transphobe, counting as a man amounts to actually possessing 
male biological traits, and so (G) comes out as false and its negation 
as true in the mouth of the transphobe.12 Even if the view yields the 
right result when (G) is uttered by trans people or their allies, for 
which the count-as parameter amounts to self-identification, this is 
a highly unsatisfactory result. While it is important for trans people 
to be able use the gender terms of their choice to self-identify, it is 
equally important that such self-identification be respected by 
others. Here we see a shift in what the right contexts in which 
sentences like (G) should come out as true are taken to be: not only 
those in which trans people utter sentences like (G), but also those 
in which such sentences (or their negations) are uttered by 
transphobes. Attributor-contextualists pursuing an ameliorative 
project may well be on board with this, yet their view cannot yield 
the desired result. 
Does the problem noted by Saul extend to any version of 
attributor-contextualism, regardless of the way of conceiving the 
count-as parameter? One interesting variant13 that might avoid it is 
one that takes the count-as parameter to be self-identification, which 
gives the following truth-conditions for (G): 
(G) is true in context CU iff John self-identifies as a man in 
CU. 
Given that John can self-identify as a man in some (types of) contexts 
(e.g., BATHROOM) but not in others (e.g., MEDICAL/ SPORTS), 
the view can easily account for the perceived variation in (G)’s truth-
value across contexts, since it simply tracks John’s self-identification 
in those contexts. As for the crucial issue, that of the truth-value of 
(G) in the mouth of the transphobe, the view yields the right result: 
                                                 
12 I am assuming that the context of the transphobe is not one in which medical or 
sports issues are at stake. 
13 Suggested by a reviewer, whom I warmly thank. A subject-contextualist version of 
the view is briefly discussed in the next section. The case of John self-identifying 
in some contexts, but not in others, will also be picked up in Section V.B. 
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the sentence comes out as true and its negation as false—as long as 
John self-identifies as a man in that context. However, while the 
focus on self-identification is welcome, I think the reliance on a 
subject self-identifying in specific contexts leads to further problems. 
Things might work well for simple sentences like (G); however, the 
view seems to have troubles with more general sentences like “All 
trans men are men” or “Trans men are men.” The procedure of 
determining the truth-value of such sentences in a (type of) context 
involves verifying whether each trans man self-identifies as such in 
that (type of) context. First, such sentences should be true (under an 
ameliorative approach) across the board and not only relative to a 
context, without needing to perform the mentioned verification in 
any particular context. Second, some trans men might self-identify 
as such in the (type of) context at stake, while others might not—yet 
the sentences in question seem true regardless of that fact, which 
shows that the mentioned verification in specific contexts is 
irrelevant for the truth-value of those sentences. Not yielding the 
right results when it comes to general sentences such as “All trans 
men are men” is a problematic consequence of any (ameliorative) 
view.  
It might be thought that attributor-contextualism can be saved 
by making it more flexible. More precisely, what is required in order 
to solve the problem highlighted by Saul is to conceive the count-as 
parameter in such a way as to allow it to be determined by the subject 
of the gender-attributing sentence while still counting as a parameter 
that is settled in CU.14 I am skeptical that such a strategy works, 
however. First, leaving the decision to defer to the subject in 
determining the count-as parameter at the latitude of the 
speaker/attributor will not work for the case in which the negation 
of (G) is uttered by a transphobe, for obvious reasons. Second, 
imposing more constraints on when to defer to the subject comes 
down to providing a principled way of distinguishing between the 
                                                 
14 DeRose (2004) has taken such an approach for “know.” 
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cases in which a speaker is to defer to the subject (non-transphobic, 
non-medical/sports contexts) and cases in which the speaker should 
not (non-transphobic, medical/sports contexts), while at the same 
time assuring that (G) comes out true in the mouth of the 
transphobe. No such principled, non-ad-hoc way seems to be on the 
horizon. 
B. Subject-Contextualism 
Subject-contextualism about gender terms is the general view 
that the truth-value of gender-attributing sentences is determined by 
various factors in the context of, or having to do with, the subject of 
the gender-attributing sentence.15 In other words, using the jargon 
introduced here, what determines the count-as parameter is not the 
speaker, but the (situation of the) subject. According to subject-
contextualism about gender terms, then, the truth-conditions for (G) 
are given by something along the following lines:  
(G) is true in context CU iff John counts as a man in CJohn. 
The difference between subject-contextualism and invariantism is 
that in the clause above, the truth of (G) is relative to a context of 
utterance, while in the invariantist clause no such relativisation is 
present. The difference between subject-contextualism and 
attributor-contextualism is that, while both views relativize the truth 
of (G) to CU, the contexts which determine the count-as parameter 
differ in the way already specified. 
It is important to get clear what CJohn means (or could mean) in 
the schema above. 16 On one understanding, it amounts to what 
John takes himself to be in his context—that is, to whether John self-
identifies as a man or not (which also amounts to a particular way 
                                                 
15 The corresponding view in the literature about ‘know’ would be subject-sensitive 
invariantism (which is in fact a form of contextualism in my sense), defended for 
example in Stanley (2005). 
16 Thanks to a reviewer for pressing me on this point. 
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of understanding the count-as parameter). Given that John can self-
identify as a man in some (types of) contexts (e.g., BATHROOM) 
but not in others (e.g., MEDICAL/SPORTS), the view can easily 
account for the perceived variation in (G)’s truth-value across 
contexts, as long as it tracks John’s self-identification in those 
contexts. As for the crucial issue, that of the truth-value of (G) in the 
mouth of the transphobe, the view yields the right result: the 
sentence comes out as true and its negation as false—as long as John 
self-identifies as a man in his own context, regardless of what the 
speaker (i.e., the transphobe) thinks. However, like the 
corresponding attributor-contextualist view briefly mentioned 
towards the end of the previous section, this variant of subject-
contextualism also runs into problems with general sentences such 
as “All trans men are men” or “Trans men are men,” and for exactly 
the same reasons. As before, I take this to be a problematic 
consequence of the view.  
A different subject-contextualist view has been recently 
proposed by Esa Díaz-León (2016), based on a different 
understanding of what CJohn comes down to. The most distinctive 
claims she makes are that what determines the count-as parameter 
are not the speaker’s beliefs and intentions (what the speaker “has 
in mind”), but “objective” considerations related to John’s situation 
that are practically relevant, and that such considerations are “the 
best theoretical and normative” ones we have (the latter including 
prudential, moral, political, aesthetic etc. considerations). 17 Like 
                                                 
17 Díaz-León uses the same similarity-based framework as Saul. The truth-conditions 
of (G) under her view are as follows: 
(G) is true in CU iff John is similar to most males with respect to the standards that 
are relevant in John’s context, given the practical purposes that are relevant in this 
context, where this should be determined by our best theoretical and normative 
considerations. (Adapted from Díaz-León, 2016: 249; the explicit relativization 
to CU is mine.) 
So, while strictly speaking the count-as parameter is determined by similarity 
standards, it is the theoretical and normative considerations that do the crucial 
work. I omit mentioning standards of simplicity in what follows for simplicity’s 
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the two views scrutinized above, this version of contextualism also 
accounts easily for the variation in (G)’s truth-value across contexts. 
Thus, in BATHROOM, the count-as parameter, as determined by 
our best theoretical and normative considerations that are 
practically relevant, simply consists in self-identifying as a man. 
Since John does self-identify as such, (G) comes out as true in this 
context. However, in MEDICAL/SPORTS, the count-as parameter, 
as determined by our best theoretical and normative considerations 
that are practically relevant, consists in actually possessing male 
biological traits. Since John does not possess such traits, (G) comes 
out as false in this context. Crucially, the view also does well when 
confronted with the problem that has marred attributor-
contextualism: (G)’s truth-value in the mouth of the transphobe. 
This is not a problem for Díaz-León’s view because the 
speaker/attributor is not who determines the count-as parameter, 
but the normative and theoretical considerations that pertain to the 
practical purpose of giving trans people the right to use the gender 
terms of their choice to self-identify. (G) thus comes out as true and 
its negation as false in the mouth of the transphobe—a highly 
satisfactory result for the ameliorative purposes at hand.  
There is thus no doubt that Díaz-León’s view is an improvement 
over attributor-contextualism on this score. Yet, I think it is 
unsatisfactory on different counts. First, as a couple of authors have 
remarked (Bettcher, 2013; Laskowski, 2020), the view is in danger 
of collapsing into a version of invariantism—not necessarily a bad 
result in itself, but an embarrassment for a view that is promoted as 
contextualist.18 A second worry for Díaz-León’s view concerns its 
major selling point: yielding the right result when (G) is uttered by 
                                                 
sake. I should also mention that Díaz-León does not talk about sports contexts, 
but I will, in order to preserve continuity with the discussion so far. 
18 To be sure, the version of invariantism Díaz-León’s view collapses into is of a 
different type than the two versions considered in Section II, one that gives 
radically different truth conditions to sentences like (G)—based on theoretical and 
normative considerations instead of biological traits or societal roles. It is also 
different from the version of invariantism I end up proposing. 
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transphobes. As we have seen, this is accomplished by taking the 
count-as parameter to be determined by “our best theoretical and 
normative considerations.” But whose considerations are they, 
exactly? No doubt, the relevant considerations vary across groups; 
and while there is no problem when the group is formed by trans 
people and their allies, there is a problem when the group is 
comprised of transphobes. In the latter case, it is their theoretical 
and normative considerations that determine the count-as parameter 
and thus the truth-value of (G), which leads to a foreseeable (bad) 
result. The answer here might be to adopt an objectivist view about 
normativity, and thus to claim that either the transphobes are right 
or they are wrong. While this reply in not objectionable per se 
(objectivist accounts of various normative areas are plenty—see, for 
example, Enoch [2011] for morality), being committed to 
objectivism in the course of giving a semantic account of gender 
terms (or of any terms, for that matter) is to bear quite a heavy 
burden. 
A final worry for the view concerns the relationship between 
the subject and the community whose theoretical and normative 
considerations are relevant for determining the count-as parameter. 
While things go smoothly when the subject and community are on a 
par in this regard, it is not clear what happens on Díaz-León’s view 
when they are not—for example, when the subject has not 
considered any issues related to gender, or when the subject 
explicitly holds a different moral, social or political outlook than the 
community, while self-identifying as a man. Subtle differences in 
how such cases are conceived might lead to different verdicts for the 
view, but the lingering worry is that problematic cases might be 
generated quite quickly. Further, even if the issue of the relation 
between the subject and the community is circumvented, as Barnes 
(2020: 728, footnote 47) notes, there might be tensions between 
moral and political considerations that drive the application of a 
certain gender term to a subject. Díaz-León is silent about such 
issues. Thus, while not necessarily decisive points against the 
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account, they do show the need for Díaz-León to fine-tune her 
view.19 
C. Ambiguity/Polysemy Views20 
A large number of natural language expressions have been 
deemed to be ambiguous or polysemous. While both presuppose a 
multitude of meanings an expression can have, the main difference 
between ambiguity and polysemy has been taken to rest in the 
relation between those meanings: while there is no relation between 
the meanings of an ambiguous term (for example, the word “bank” 
means both a financial institution and the slopes bordering a river, 
with no relation between them), the meanings of a polysemous term 
are related in some way (for example, while there are many ways to 
cut something, all the sense of ‘cut’ have in common some operation 
that results in separate parts).  
Several authors have proposed construing gender terms as 
ambiguous or polysemous as well. For example, Talia Mae Bettcher 
(2009) holds that there are (at least) two meanings of gender terms: 
a dominant one, embraced by the mainstream culture, and a resistant 
one, used in subcultures like those formed by trans people and their 
allies. Bettcher claims that this “multiple-meaning” view is better 
equipped to deal with the problems faced by trans people that 
“single-meaning” positions, which comprise both invariantist and 
contextualist views as I have understood them here. According to 
the dominant meaning, someone counts as a man if they have certain 
biological traits; according to the resistant meaning, someone counts 
as a man if they self-identify as such. A similar view that postulates 
more than one meaning for gender terms has recently been proposed 
                                                 
19 For a more detailed case against Díaz-León’s view along similar lines, see Zeman 
(2020). For other objections, see Bettcher (2017).  
20 While the two authors discussed below reject the label “contextualism,” I have 
grouped their views under such a heading because, according to both, there is 
variation in truth-value of sentences like (G) across contexts that is due to the 
meaning(s) of the terms themselves. 
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by N. G. Laskowski (2020). He claims that gender terms are not 
ambiguous, but polysemous (that is, they have several, inter-related 
meanings). Laskowski takes this view to fare better than Díaz-León’s 
with respect to the main issue focused on in this paper, and to 
invalidate her claim that subject-contextualism has an advantage 
over Bettcher’s ambiguity view. 
Presumably, none of these views has issues with accounting for 
the perceived variation in truth-value of sentences like (G) across 
contexts (i.e., by selecting different meanings of “man” in different 
contexts). However, ambiguity/polysemy views, while significantly 
different from each other, are hopeless when taken to be part of an 
ameliorative project of the type I am pursuing here. The reasons are 
essentially those given by Díaz-León (2016) in her criticism of 
Bettcher’s view.21 In a nutshell, and applied to our example, the 
problem is that even if some people embrace the resistant meaning 
of “man,” the transphobes are within their semantic rights to use the 
dominant one, since both meanings are part of the overall meaning 
of the term. This is not like a situation in which someone thinks that 
“elm” means beech, where we feel no inclination to say that they are 
right and that there are two meanings of the word; instead, we 
simply think that that person is wrong with respect to the word 
“elm.” Ambiguity/polysemy views, however, cannot hold this about 
“man”; their proponents are thus forced to accept that there are 
contexts in which sentences like (G) are false—not “harmless” 
contexts like MEDICAL/SPORTS, but ones in which such sentences 
are uttered by transphobes. Thus, while it is reasonable to say that 
Bettcher or Laskowski’s proposals might work from a descriptive 
point of view (Díaz-León’s disagreement notwithstanding), they 
                                                 
21 Of course, Díaz-León takes her criticism to apply Bettcher’s view taken as a 
descriptive project, which she takes to incorporate moral, social and political 
considerations, whereas I take them to apply to the view taken as an ameliorative 
one. 
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should not be adopted by someone pursuing an ameliorative project 
like the one assumed here.22, 23 
D. An Assertability-Based View24 
Elizabeth Barnes (2020) has recently put forward a 
comprehensive view about gender, gender terms and their relation. 
She aims to provide a middle ground between the view that the 
metaphysics of gender dictates the truth-values of sentences like (G) 
and the claim that the meaning of gender terms is given by their use. 
Thus, Barnes argues that our conceptions of gender influence the 
truth-conditions of sentences like (G), but they do not strictly 
                                                 
22 Bettcher takes amelioration to come down to accepting one of the two meanings 
of gender terms (the resistant one) and rejecting the other (the dominant one), as 
the latter is based on and encapsulates a worldview that propagates injustice for 
trans people. By doing so, one rejects not only the meaning of a word, but the 
whole worldview on which it is based, thus actively fighting against discrimination 
of trans people. Laskowski is neutral about what amelioration is. 
23 A different view that might be considered to appeal to ambiguity/polysemy is 
Jenkins’ (2016). Jenkins claims that not one, but two concepts of gender (she 
focuses on the concept of woman, but quite possibly similar considerations apply 
to the concept of man, especially in connection to trans men) should be part of an 
ameliorative project: namely, gender as class and gender as identity. However, 
when it comes to using gender terms, she claims that “woman” (and, presumably, 
‘man’) should be employed so that to express the latter concept and advises using 
a different expression to track the former. Thus, Jenkins’ view does not face the 
problems the ambiguity/polysemy views discussed above face. Although she is not 
explicit about the semantic treatment of gender terms she prefers, I take her view 
to come quite close (at least in broad outlines) to the view I end up proposing. 
24 As with the views in the previous section, I take Barnes’ to be (broadly) 
contextualist for the same reasons. Regarding amelioration, she takes it to concern 
assertability-conditions and not truth-values, and is thus in this sense based on 
pragmatics rather than semantics. While I made it clear that my concern in this 
paper is strictly with amelioration as a purely semantic enterprise, I consider 
Barnes’ view because i) it seems to be farther away from the usual pragmatic views 
dealing with presuppositions, implicatures, ambiguity resolution etc.; ii) 
assertability-conditions are attached to the same entities that bear truth-values 
(that is, sentences and their contents) and not to other entities (presuppositions, 
implicatures etc.). 
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speaking provide them. She defends a contextualist version of the 
“social position account” of gender—essentially, Haslanger’s. The 
main implications of her view for issues pursued in this paper are 
expressed in the following quote: 
[The worry that (G) comes out as false in the mouth of the 
transphobe] can be avoided on the picture I’m defending 
here. It’s a mistake, I think, to focus too much on the mere 
truth of sentences like [(G)]. Truth is relatively easy to come 
by for natural language sentences . . . . Communication, on 
the other hand, is hard. There are probably contexts in 
which sentences like ‘Trans women aren’t women’ or 
‘There’s no such thing as being nonbinary’ are literally true. 
But it doesn’t follow that such sentences are ever assertable, 
appropriate things to say. There are many things, over and 
above the basic content, which are communicated by a 
typical utterance of a sentence like ‘Trans women aren’t 
women’. This often includes things like ‘Gender is 
determined by biology’, ‘There is a correct way to express 
and experience gender’, ‘There’s something wrong or 
defective about people whose gender identity is different 
from the gender they were assigned at birth’, and so on. 
On the view I’m defending, these are false in any context, 
simply because they misdescribe the basic social reality of 
gender. . . . Thus even if one can, strictly speaking, truly say 
in a context ‘Trans women aren’t really women’ or ‘There’s 
no such thing as being genderqueer’, much of what one 
typically communicates by such an assertion will be false, 
making it an incorrect and inappropriate thing to say. 
(Barnes, 2020: 721-722) 
I think there are a couple of unclear points in this account, 
which might lead to problems. One worry I have is this: According 
to Barnes, there are contexts in which sentences like “Trans women 
are not women” are true, yet they are not assertable in any context 
because they communicate a host of claims that are false (the list in 
the quote), since they misrepresent (social) reality. While one might 
agree with what she says about such general sentences, one wonders 
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how exactly this strategy applies to negations of sentences like (G). 
Barnes does not discuss such sentences in this connection, but it is 
not unreasonable to say that she would treat them in the same 
manner as the more general ones above: that is, she would claim that 
they are not assertable in any contexts because they communicate 
(some) false claims. Yet, it is not clear what asserting that John is not 
a man by uttering the negation of (G) communicates. Is it the same 
things as in the case of the corresponding general sentence “Trans 
men are not men” (presumably, the claims on the list)? That seems 
quite a stretch: how exactly does one get from uttering (G) to 
communicating that, say, gender is determined by biology? Is it then 
something else? If so, what is it? Obviously, context should play a 
great role in determining what is being communicated in a specific 
situation, but Barnes does not give much detail. However, I contend, 
such detail is needed in order to ascertain whether then view can 
successfully apply to sentences like (G) and their negations. 
Further, and perhaps more importantly, even if it is clear what 
a sentence usually communicates (in general, or in a certain type of 
context), I do not think the strategy works for all situations. 
Consider, again, medical contexts. Assume that in such a context a 
doctor asserts the negation of (G) in response to a specific medical 
problem. Assume also that Barnes’ view takes an utterance of such a 
sentence to communicate all the things she claims sentences like 
“Trans women are not women” communicate. It seems to me easy 
to imagine, with such assumptions in place, a situation in which the 
doctor did not intend, nor was taken in that context to communicate 
any of those things. In fact, we can imagine the doctor to take 
themselves to be a great supporter of trans people’s fight against 
discrimination. If so, then I think we should say that the doctor did 
not communicate any of the horrible things on the list (or any other 
objectionable ones). If the case is coherent and the diagnosis 
acceptable, it shows that there are cases in which the negation of (G) 
is true and perfectly assertable, since none of the things on the list 
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was communicated.25 This shows that the strategy does not apply to 
all situations. It is true that Barnes says that the claims on the said 
list are “typically communicated” (by assertions of the negations of 
sentences like (G), we assumed), but I do not think the escape route 
of taking the devised situation to be untypical is plausible here: 
medical contexts and trans-friendly doctors are (one may hope) 
quite typical. Barnes’ view, then, leads to unwanted results.26 
IV. Relativist Views 
Relativism about a type of expression is the general view that 
the truth-value of sentences containing the target expression, but no 
other obviously (or arguably) context-sensitive terms, vary across 
contexts, not because the contents of those sentences are different 
in different contexts, but because of differences in the 
“circumstances of evaluation” (Kaplan’s [1989] term) with respect 
to which they are evaluated. Relativism is one of the main 
contenders in the semantic debate about a wide array of natural 
language expressions, such as predicates of taste, aesthetic adjectives, 
                                                 
25 The trouble might be with what Barnes takes communication to be. I confess that 
I am at a loss in this respect: in her description, there seems to be no audience or 
communicative intentions etc. Maybe she takes the audience to be us, the readers. 
This strikes me as rather ad-hoc. I am happy to concede that this objection might 
be based on a lack of understanding of her view on communication. 
26 Some views that have been put forward in the debate about the metaphysics of 
gender might be thought to have contextualist implications. For example, Mikkola 
(2011) proposes the “trait/norm covariation model” as a replacement of the 
sex/gender distinction; Haslanger (2016) adopts a pluralist stance on explanation 
concerning social kinds like gender; Ásta (2018) takes gender to be socially 
constructed and spells the latter out in a conferralist framework; etc. Since such 
views are developed with focus on metaphysical rather than on semantic issues, 
there is an amount of speculation as to what exactly their contextualist 
implications are (for example, whether their proponents would adopt attributor-
contextualism, subject-contextualism or other forms). As far as I can see, they run 
into the same problems as the views discussed above, and thus are not suitable for 
an ameliorative project of the kind I am pursuing—which, of course, does not 
mean that they are not suitable for other types of ameliorative projects. 
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moral terms, epistemic modals, knowledge ascriptions etc. In fact, 
there are several views that go by the name “relativism” in 
contemporary semantics. Two broad categories can be 
distinguished: a more conservative and more radical one. Both 
versions build on Kaplan’s distinction between context of utterance 
and circumstance of evaluation, and both versions situate the 
relevant parameters in the latter (and not in the content of 
utterances, as contextualism would have it). Where they differ, 
however, is the context they claim provides the relevant parameter: 
the context of utterance (CU), for moderate versions (e.g., Kölbel 
[2004]); the context of assessment (CA)—which is simply any 
context in which an utterance, possibly uttered in a different 
context, is evaluated for truth—for radical ones (e.g., MacFarlane 
[2014]. So, while the first version differs from the orthodox 
Kaplanian framework in that it introduces more parameters in the 
circumstance of evaluation, the second postulates an entirely new 
type of context to which the truth-value of utterances is relativized. 
Although (to my knowledge) no one has held a relativist view 
of gender terms, it might be interesting to explore what it has to 
offer. While the moderate version of relativism has played a big role 
in the debate over the semantics of the terms mentioned above, I 
take the more interesting view for the purposes of this paper to be 
the radical one. 27  Applied to gender terms, this radical version 
(henceforth “relativism”) holds that the count-as parameter is a part 
of the circumstances of evaluation and that it is provided by CA (not 
CU). In its general formulation, relativism assigns the following 
truth-conditions to (G): 
(G) is true as uttered in CU and assessed in CA iff John counts 
as a man in CA. 
                                                 
27 One good reason to put the moderate view aside in this context is that the results 
it yields are similar to those of attributor-contextualism (since the values of the 
count-as parameter are set by Cu), thus inheriting its shortcomings. 
Invariantist, Contextualist, and Relativist Accounts of Gender Terms 763 
The difference between relativism and both invariantism and 
contextualism is that in the clause above, the truth of (G) is doubly 
relative: to a context of utterance (thus distinguishing it from 
invariantism) and to a context of assessment (thus distinguishing it 
from contextualism). 
Why would anyone adopt relativism about gender terms? On 
the face of it, the view seems to have some advantages over 
contextualism. First, like contextualism, it accounts for the variation 
in (G)’s truth-value across contexts. Two types of situations need to 
be distinguished here: one in which CU is the same as CA—for 
example, cases in which someone merely utters a sentence, where 
the person uttering it is also the assessor, and one in which CU differs 
from CA—for example, cases in which a person utters a sentence but 
a different person, situated in a different context, evaluates it. Since 
the cases to be accounted for involve a speaker uttering (G) in two 
different contexts, the type of situation relevant in accounting for 
the aforementioned variation is the former. And relativism accounts 
for it because, while the count-as parameter is that of CA, in this case 
CA is the same as CU, and thus the count-as parameter is set in CU. 
So, in BATHROOM, (G) comes out as true, since in that context 
John counts as a man; in contrast, in MEDICAL/SPORTS, (G) comes 
out as false, since in that context John does not count as a man. 
Relativism also yields some right results in situations of the 
second type—most importantly, in the case that proved problematic 
for several versions of contextualism, that of sentences like (G) being 
uttered by transphobes. Thus, when (G) is uttered by a transphobe 
and assessed by a trans man or an ally, the count-as parameter is that 
of CA, not that of CU, and thus (G) comes out as true because in CA 
John counts as a man—even if the sentence was uttered by a 
transphobe. This neatly solves the problem.28 
                                                 
28 One possible additional positive point in favor of relativism is that it can account 
for the fact that after transitioning, some trans people take their previous 
statements about their own gender as false not only in their current context, but 
also when they were made (that is, they take themselves to have been previously 
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However, relativism has also obvious disadvantages—most 
prominently, the fact that it offers only a partial solution to the 
problem at hand. Thus, while the view yields the right result when 
(G) is uttered by a transphobe and assessed by a trans man or an ally, 
it fails to do so when (G) is uttered by a trans man or an ally and 
assessed by a transphobe. The reason is the same in both situations 
and pertains to the mechanism for assessing utterances that is built 
into the view. So, when (G) is uttered by a trans man or an ally and 
assessed by a transphobe, the count-as parameter is that of CA, not 
that of CU, and thus (G) comes out as false because in CA John does 
not count as a man—even if the sentence was uttered by a trans man 
or an ally. This is a bad result. In addition, the view is also 
problematic in some of the cases in which CU and CA coincide: 
namely, in contexts in which (G) is uttered by a transphobe, where 
it predicts that (G) comes as out false, because the count-as 
parameter is set by CU—that is, by the transphobe (even if (G) comes 
out as true in contexts in which it is uttered by trans men or allies). 
                                                 
wrong about their own gender). This lines up with a phenomenon that has been 
thought to support relativism: retraction. A retraction is an act of “taking back” 
an assertion previously made, on the grounds that it is currently false—usually by 
means of phrases like “I was wrong” (For favorable discussions of retraction in 
relativist literature, see Egan et al., 2005; MacFarlane, 2014. For critical views, 
see Marques, 2018, among others). Relativism accounts for such cases because, 
when trans people assess their claims about their own gender made before 
transitioning, the count-as parameter is that of CA and the CA they occupy now is 
different from the one occupied before transitioning. Of course, this is good news 
for relativism only insofar it is a robust phenomenon that trans people take 
themselves to have been previously wrong about their own gender after 
transitioning. Despite the existence of a common narrative that might support this 
idea (expressed, arguably, by statements like “I always knew I was a man,” “I knew 
that something was wrong about my gender” etc.), there surely are alternative 
narratives concerning transition. What is worse, if such alternative narratives 
support the idea that some trans people do not, in fact, take themselves to have 
been previously wrong about their own gender, this might become a problem for 
relativism instead of a point in its favor. More data on this, as well as extreme 
caution, is needed here. Many thanks to Em Sun (Mihaela Biolan) and Elin 
McCready for talking to me about this issue. 
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Thus, while initially promising, relativism does not lead to 
significant progress over contextualism, and is thus unsuitable for 
the ameliorative project pursued here. 
As with attributor-contextualism, there might be more flexible 
versions of relativism.29 More precisely, what is required in order 
to solve the problem in the cases in which CA and CU differ is to 
conceive the count-as parameter in such a way as to allow it to be 
determined by the speaker, while still counting as a parameter that 
is settled in CA. Here, too, I have my reservations. First, as before, 
leaving the decision to defer to the speaker in determining the count-
as parameter at the latitude of the assessor will not work for the case 
in which (G) is assessed by a transphobe, for obvious reasons. 
Second, imposing more constraints on when to defer to the speaker 
comes down to providing a principled way to distinguish between 
the various cases; and while such a principled way has been given in 
the case of epistemic modals or knowledge attributions, it is hard to 
see how this could be done in the case of gender terms in a non-ad-
hoc manner or without having relativism collapse into a different 
view. Finally, even if a principled way to construct a flexible view is 
allowed, it will not help with cases in which CU and CA coincide, as 
this would impose unrealistic demands on asserting.30 
V. Back Where We Started: A Self-Identification- 
Based Invariantist View  
Simple versions of contextualism and relativism yield wrong 
results. Their more flexible versions are currently underdeveloped. 
                                                 
29 For example, MacFarlane (2011) has proposed a flexible version to account for 
various cases involving epistemic modals, and the same strategy has been pursued 
in Zeman (2010) for “know.” 
30 That is, it would demand someone in a CU to consider all the possible CAs and 
then adopt the count-as parameter from there. See Marques (2014) for making 
this point as an objection to MacFarlane’s account of assertion. 
766 EURAMERICA 
The two invariantist views presented at the outset seem to be non-
starters. What are we to do?   
I think there is a particular invariantist view that is worth 
exploring in connection to the type of ameliorative approach 
assumed in this paper. A lot of the examples discussed in the 
literature, including those above, involve people self-identifying as 
being of a certain gender. A natural thought, then, is to investigate 
an invariantist view in which the only or the key factor for 
determining the truth-value of utterances like (G) is self-
identification. In fact, many authors in the literature have 
acknowledged the importance of self-identification (Ásta, 2013; 
Bettcher, 2009; Jenkins, 2016), and as a consequence have included 
it among the desiderata of an ameliorative project, even if they have 
different views about what such a project amounts to than mine. In 
the remainder of this section, I present the general form such a view 
takes (call it “self-identification invariantism”—“SII,” for short) and 
consider some possible objections. 
According to SII in its more general form, the truth-conditions 
for (G) are given by the following clause: 
(G) is true iff John self-identifies as a man. 
The first thing to note about it is that no relativization is present: 
there is no relativization to a context of assessment, as in relativism; 
but there is also no relativization to a context of utterance, as 
contextualism would have it. Sentences like (G) have absolute truth-
conditions. This is how it should be, as the view is an invariantist 
one. More importantly, the view easily avoids the problem besetting 
some versions of contextualism and relativism, that of the truth-
value of (G) as uttered or evaluated by transphobes. Simply, the 
sentence is true if and only if John self-identifies as a man, regardless 
of what the transphobe thinks. Since he does, (G) is true—end of 
story. 
Put like this, the view is deceptively simple. A lot of issues arise, 
some of which I discuss in turn below. 
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A. What Is Self-Identification? 
One question that arises immediately concerns self-
identification: what is it? The question leads to a worry, namely that, 
absent a precise answer to the question, the clause for the truth-
conditions of (G) given above is useless. After all, if we do not know 
what does it mean that a person self-identifies as being of a certain 
gender, then we are not able to establish the truth-value of sentences 
like (G), and thus we will not be able to say whether a person is a 
man, a woman—or of any other gender, for that matter. 
The question of what self-identification amounts to is a 
legitimate one, and a very difficult one at that. There are several 
ways to approach this issue. First, one might simply take a 
nonchalant attitude towards the question of what self-identification 
is. Such an attitude could be buttressed by the observation that 
semantics is not in the business of providing answers to hard 
questions that, strictly speaking, belong to a different area of 
inquiry. Compare with the following situation: suppose we want to 
give the truth-conditions of the sentence “This chemical element is 
gold.” Suppose further that this sentence is true if and only if the 
element referred to has atomic number 79. Knowing whether the 
element has atomic number 79 is enough for the semanticist to draw 
conclusions about the sentence’s truth-value. As semanticists, we do 
not need to know how to determine the atomic number of an 
element, nor what an atomic number is. Clearly, that is a task for 
physicists. 31 In a similar vein, in giving the truth-conditions for 
sentences like (G) above, the semanticist need not come up with an 
account of what self-identification is—that is, plausibly, a task better 
suited for sociologists, psychologists or philosophers from different 
areas of inquiry. 
                                                 
31 I take this to be similar to Barnes’ (2020) point about the irrelevance of deep 
metaphysical debates about what a table is for a sentence like “This is a table” 
having a truth-value. 
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I am sympathetic to the approach described above, but other, 
less radical, are available too. A more substantial approach to the 
issue is not silence, but the adoption of any workable account of self-
identification from the literature—provided, of course, it is coherent 
and does not clash with our ameliorative aims. Luckily, there are 
several such accounts on the market (e.g., Bettcher, 2009; Jenkins, 
2016). The point is not that such accounts are flawless (in fact, they 
have their critics—see, for example, Barnes [2020] for objections to 
the two accounts mentioned),32 but that the semanticist can keep an 
open mind about which of the competing accounts is ultimately the 
best without needing to commit to any particular account. To 
continue the analogy with gold, in determining the truth-value of 
“This chemical element is gold,” under the assumption that the way 
to identify an element is to know its atomic number, the semanticist 
need not be worried about debates concerning how exactly to do 
that or what an atomic number is. A semantic view about gender 
terms, then, need not stand or fall with any particular account of 
self-identification. If this optimism is not justified, perhaps there is 
another way to reconcile competing accounts: to be a pluralist about 
self-identification—that is, to adopt the idea that it amounts to 
different things in different contexts. Whether extant competing 
accounts can in fact be reconciled into a pluralist framework is of 
course something that has to be determined carefully, but the point 
about the neutrality of semantics, I think, remains.33 
                                                 
32 One of Barnes’ objections is that the views mentioned fail to categorize certain 
people as gendered. I will address this objection, as it applies to my own account, 
in Section V.C. 
33 This neutrality allows the proponent of SII to take self-identification to include a 
social dimension, one that includes gender-related societal norms that might be 
internalized or opposed. On a view like Jenkins’ (2016), for example, “there must 
be some genuine correspondence between the norms people take to be relevant to 
themselves and the norms associated with the relevant gender class in at least some 
context, although this correspondence need not be perfect” (2016: 412). Thus, 
she takes gender identity to be “a response to the social norms that are associated 
with the social positions that constitute gender as class. A consequence of this is 
that the nature of those social positions will have implications for gender as 
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If the two approaches delineated above are still deemed 
unsatisfactory, a third attempt at tackling the issue of what is self-
identification is to come up with a “minimal” account, one that 
captures the main characteristics of the phenomenon and which 
would be hopefully agreed upon by (most of) those involved in the 
debate. Perhaps the following sufficient condition for self-
identification can be taken as a starting point: 
A subject S self-identifies as gender G if S is disposed, under 
normal conditions, to assent to sentences like ‘s is (a) g’ and 
their cognates, where ‘s’ is a term that designates S and ‘g’ a 
term that designates G. 
Of course, what the “normal conditions” are or should be is a key 
question. For example, they might require that the subject be 
sincere. That would rule out spurious self-identifications. Lack of 
confusion about one’s gender should perhaps be included too.34 To 
be sure, this is a very sketchy start of a possible minimal notion of 
self-identification. But, to repeat myself, I ultimately do not think 
that solving this issue is the semanticist’s job.35  
                                                 
identity” (2016: 412). Similarly, SII is compatible with gender identity being 
complex—that is, a combination of personal and social factors and various ways 
they mesh. 
34 That is not to say that situations in which people are confused about their gender 
are infrequent or that people in such situations (perhaps in the middle of a 
transitioning process) should be ignored by an ameliorative project. But it seems 
trivial to say that in such cases the question of what one’s gender is has (yet) no 
answer. Also, the case of a subject being confused about their gender is different 
from the case in which the subject self-identifies as gender-fluid. Nothing in the 
(putative) definition of self-identification given is meant to exclude such subjects. 
SII itself is entirely compatible with gender-fluidity. The issue of gender-fluidity’s 
role in fighting gender inequality and oppression by challenging the binary gender 
system (thought of as presupposing stable gender identities) is interesting. For a 
discussion of how self-identification with a stable gender identity can be 
incorporated into a post-identity radical gender theory, see McQueen (2016). 
35 Further modifications to the definition above will be suggested in Section V.C, 
where I investigate possible problematic cases for SII. 
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B. Truth-Value Variation Across Contexts 
Another kind of worry for SII is related to the perceived 
variation in truth-value of sentences like (G) across contexts—
variation that has played an important role in motivating the 
contextualist and relativist approaches scrutinized above. Regardless 
of whether one actually has the intuitions I went along with, it is 
clear that an invariantist view has problems accounting for such 
variation by purely semantic means. 
Many participants in the debate over the semantics of gender 
terms (but also in that about the metaphysical status of gender) seem 
to accept the truth-value variation at stake. While this is 
unproblematic when it comes to the way gendered terms are 
currently used (and thus could be the starting point for descriptive 
projects), the question arises whether such intuitions must be 
preserved within an ameliorative project. I think “no” is the right 
answer here. This, then, is another point in which the right contexts 
in which sentences like (G) should come out as true are different 
from what the other views discussed take them to be. In a nutshell, 
for the defender of SII, all contexts are right contexts—that is, (G) 
should come out in all contexts: those in which such sentences are 
uttered by transphobes, but also in scenarios like MEDICAL/ 
SPORTS.36 
                                                 
36 One might wonder (as a reviewer does) why, if the right contexts are taken to be 
all contexts, a more direct argument couldn’t have been provided against the views 
discussed in previous sections. I agree that such a direct argument could have been 
given. However, I didn’t take that route for two reasons. First, as I made clear 
from the outset, one of my aims in this paper is to provide a map of possible 
ameliorative semantic accounts of gender terms. Giving the direct argument 
alluded to above would have directly undermined this aim. Second, and perhaps 
more importantly, the views scrutinized fail as ameliorative accounts of gender 
terms not because they don’t take this radical view about what the right contexts 
are, but due to their inability to account for the cases they themselves set to 
account for or due to other aspects that turn out to be problematic. So, not taking 
the more direct route has allowed me to both consider and criticize a larger array 
of possible ameliorative accounts, thus giving a more complete picture of the 
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How can this claim be supported? While making it such that 
sentences like (G) come out as true even in the mouth of the 
transphobe has been a desideratum at least for some ameliorativists, 
not the same can be said about the latter type of scenarios. Yet, I 
think that a quick look at what is in fact already happening 
worldwide and an earnest consideration of the true purposes of an 
ameliorative project are revealing. Regarding medical contexts, 
many medical facilities have nowadays explicit instructions for 
medical personnel to use the gender terms their trans patients prefer. 
Surely such a tendency is worth keeping as part of an ameliorative 
project. Perhaps more radically, it could be even argued that gender 
terms should be eliminated entirely from medical practice (it seems 
plausible to hold that they can be, given the many alternatives 
available—the use of sex terms instead, or of purely 
biological/medical terms etc.). Regarding sports contexts, in recent 
years more and more organizations have allowed trans people to 
participate in competitions for the gender they self-identify with. 
While many details are yet to be worked out (for example, whether 
the International Olympic Committee’s ruling to base the decision 
of allowing a person to participate in men’s/women’s sports 
competitions on their level of testosterone is the right way to go), it 
is at least reasonable to hold that such a tendency should be 
preserved in an ameliorative project.37 Both these facts seem to me 
                                                 
theoretical landscape—which I take to have at least some value. 
37 This is very far from doing justice to the multitude of issues that arise in connection 
to trans people participating in sports competition and which are discussed in the 
growing literature on the topic. In addition, making the case for trans men 
participating in men’s sports competitions seems to be “easier” than making the 
case for trans women participating in women’s sports competitions. One 
important issue discussed in this connection is the disparity in physical 
characteristics between trans and cis women, which presumably gives the former 
an unfair advantage over the latter; the same disparity, however, is not perceived 
as problematic when exhibited by trans and cis men. While such issues are highly 
relevant in discussing trans people’s participation in sports, I do not think they are 
crucial for the point I am making. See the essays in Krane (2019)—particularly 
Semerjian (2019)—for recent takes on this issue, and Daly (2015) for a discussion 
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very close to the true commitments of an ameliorative stance. But, 
if so, the reasons for accepting the perceived variation in truth-value 
of sentences like (G) across contexts (including MEDICAL/ 
SPORTS) vanishes, and with it the problem such variation has been 
thought to pose to SII. 
A situation that runs counter to taking this stance towards the 
right contexts is the following.38 Previously, I considered variants of 
contextualism in which the count-as parameter was taken to be a 
person’s self-identification as of a certain gender, yet which allowed 
some variation in truth-value across contexts due to the fact that the 
subject self-identifies as of a certain gender in some (types of) 
contexts, but not in others. Thus, suppose that John self-identifies 
as a man in BATHROOM, but not in MEDICAL/ SPORTS (or 
among friends but not at work etc.). Since this is consistent with the 
“minimal” view of self-identification put forward above (and, 
presumably, not ruled out by more substantive views of self-
identification), it poses at least a prima facie problem for SII by 
allowing (G) to come out as false in certain contexts. 
I think that this kind of variation can be accommodated by 
introducing a context (or type of context) in the right-hand side of 
the definition above: 
(G) is true iff John self-identifies as a man in a context C. 
What is important to note is that this is not a contextualist (nor a 
relativist, for that matter) view: there is no relativization of the 
truth-value of sentences like (G) to any contexts, even though the 
(types of) contexts in which self-identification takes place matter by 
playing a role in determining the truth-value of the sentences at 
stake. Thus, this slight and rather technical modification has at least 
one important consequence: namely, it accommodates the 
possibility of variation in truth-value of sentences like (G) while 
                                                 
related to semantics of sex terms. 
38 Again, I thank a reviewer for bringing this case to my attention. 
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remaining an invariantist view solely based on self-identification. 
Additionally, it yields the right result when (G) is uttered or assessed 
by the transphobe: as long as John self-identifies as a man in a certain 
context, (G) is true regardless of who is uttering/assessing it. Finally, 
the view thus modified does not fall prey to the problem 
contextualist views of this type had with general sentences like “All 
trans men are men,” and “Trans men are men” (as shown in Section 
III): if someone self- identifies as a man in a (type of) context, then 
he is a man tout court, and since each trans man presumably self-
identifies as such in at least one (type of) context, there is no need 
to check whether all trans men self-identify as such in any particular 
context to deliver the truth-value of the general sentences. 
Which exact form the theory will ultimately take depends on 
what it turns out the right contexts should be, according to our 
ameliorative desiderata. Here I have shown that, even if one does 
not take the radical stance towards what those contexts are exposed 
above and thus allows some variation in the truth-value of sentences 
like (G) across contexts, SII is well-positioned to handle it.  
C. Further Problematic Cases 
A third type of worry concerns other types of possible 
problematic cases for the view. SII takes the key factor for 
determining the truth-value of (G) to be John’s self-identification as 
a man. But what happens if self-identification is missing? There are 
several reasons why this might occur. 
First, imagine that John is, for all intents and purposes, taken 
to be a man by all members of his community, leads a life full of 
“manly” activities, conforms to stereotypes associated with men etc. 
John, however, does not self-identify as a man, but as being of a 
different gender. Second, consider a similar scenario in which John 
does not self-identify as a man, but neither does he as being of a 
different gender; as a reviewer helpfully put it, “it’s not that [John] 
refuses to self-identify as a man; rather, it’s not something [John] 
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ever considers.” Third, a more radical case has been brought up by 
Barnes (2020): namely, that of cognitively impaired people who do 
not have the means to self-identify, but to which we would hardly 
refrain from assigning a certain gender. In all these cases, SII predicts 
that (G) comes out as false.  
Further problems might come from cases in which John does 
self-identify as a man, but in less than optimal, or strained 
circumstances—for example, when he does so because he has (or 
feels he has) no choice, he is afraid for his wellbeing etc. Here the 
view predicts that (G) comes out as true in these contexts, but it is 
not clear that this is the right verdict. 
What can be said in reply? The answer depends on the case. In 
the first, in which John does not self-identify as a man but as being 
of a different gender, despite living a “manly” life, being perceived 
as a man, etc. the element that presumably drives the intuition that 
(G) is true in this context is John’s lifestyle and the perception of 
others. Yet, it seems to me that the best reply here is to reject that 
intuition and claim that, in fact, John is right and everyone else is 
wrong. That is, what has to be accounted for is the intuition that (G) 
is false in this contest, and the view delivers precisely that, given that 
the self-identification condition is not met.39 
The second problematic case mentioned above, that in which 
John does not actively refuse to self-identify, but simply does not 
consider the issue of his gender at all, strikes me as very far-fetched. 
Given the important role gender plays in our lives, and the extant 
pressure to “adopt” a gender or another, it is hard do believe that 
someone would simply not consider the issue (I am assuming here 
that John is an adult). But philosophy is full of far-fetched scenarios, 
so this answer might not be satisfactory. What I find most promising 
instead is to resort to a conditional element: if John were to consider 
                                                 
39 This seems to fit well with Jenkins’ (2016) claim that using gender terms so that 
to encode concepts of “having a gender identity” is the better option from an 
ameliorative point of view. 
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the issue of his own gender, he would self-identify as a man.40 This 
can be made part of the minimal notion of self-identification 
sketched in Section V.A., or be explicitly introduced in the clause 
for the truth-conditions of sentences like (G). 
The third problematic case on the table is that involving 
cognitively impaired people that lack the capacity to self-identify but 
to which we do not hesitate to assign a gender. This is a complicated 
case, and one in which I think the proponent of SII must (somewhat) 
bite the bullet. The answer, I believe, has the best chances to alleviate 
the problem for the view is that in such a case it is indeterminate 
whether (G) is true or not. After all, the key feature in establishing 
the truth-value of sentences like (G) is missing, and, by the design of 
the case, this situation cannot be remedied. (Compare this with the 
situation in which we have lost all means to calculate an element’s 
atomic number: assuming that this is the only way to identify an 
element, a sentence like “This chemical element is gold” might be 
true, but we would have no way to find out.) Claiming this, 
however, is compatible with ascriptions of gender to the cognitively 
impaired for practical purposes—in situations like MEDICAL, for 
example. Under the proposed fix, such a practice would be similar 
to the way we sometimes take imprecise sentences or those we know 
are false to be true for practical purposes. Granted, postulating this 
type of indeterminacy is a burden for the proponent of SII, but how 
detrimental it ultimately is to the view might only become clear after 
a thorough comparison with rival views is undertaken. 
Finally, the case in which John self-identifies as a man because 
he has (or feels he has) no choice. I agree that something here is 
amiss. While the sincerity condition might be extended to cover this 
case too, and thus exclude the case as problematic, this does not 
seem to get to the heart of the matter. A better alternative is to 
require that self-identification be done freely, without constraints 
                                                 
40 It is important that here that John is able, in principle, to consider the issue of his 
own gender. This is not true for the next case. 
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from external factors. As before, this condition can be made part of 
the minimal notion of self-identification itself or be explicitly 
introduced in the clause for the truth-conditions of sentences like 
(G).41 
VI. Summary and Conclusion 
In this paper I have investigated three well-known views in the 
semantics of natural language terms (invariantism, contextualism, 
relativism) in order to ascertain which could be adopted by an 
ameliorative approach to gender terms (specifically, “man”), 
understood as a purely semantic business. I have found various 
versions of these views wanting. I have then reconsidered 
invariantism and proposed a view that takes the unique or the key 
element that determines the truth-value of sentences like (G) to be 
self-identification. I have explored several problems arising for this 
view and tried to answer them. While I acknowledge that this is only 
one way of pursuing an ameliorative project among many, I hope 
that it will prove useful at least for some ameliorativists. 
                                                 
41 Thus, factoring in all the possible modifications mentioned in this subsection, the 
truth-conditions for (G) will be something along the following lines: 
(G) is true iff John, after considering the issue of his own gender, freely self-
identifies as a man. 
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摘 要 
本文探討的是數個現存與可能的關於性別詞的改良型語義學理
論：根據「恆定主義」，性別語詞的意義無關於脈絡；根據「脈絡主
義」，性別詞的意義是在使用脈絡中被確立；根據「相對主義」，性
別詞的意義則是在評價脈絡中被確立。本文指出這些理論都面臨一個
困境，即，它們皆無法妥適處理跨性別者選擇符合其自我認同的性別
詞。作者提出一個基於自我認同的恆定主義的分析，並討論這樣的處
理所面臨的一些挑戰。 
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